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European Sociological Review 12:127-146 1996
© 1996 Oxford University Press

research-article

Rational Choice, Empirical Research, and the Sociological Tradition

Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg

Department of Sociology, Stockholm University 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden.

In this article we argue that rational choice theory can play a progressive role in unifying theoretical and empirical work in sociology. The basis of rational choice theorizing is outlined, and it is argued that important ideas of Karl Popper, Max Weber, and Robert K. Merton properly belong in this tradition. Three elements in rational choice theorizing are deemed particularly essential for explanatory sociological theory: the principle of methodological individualism, the analytical mode of theorizing, and the notion of intentional explanation. The article also contains a critique of variable-centred research for paying insufficient attention to the role of actions and intentions in generating the data being observed. Acceptable explanations should, in principle, always specify the mechanism(s) involved, and this usually requires direct references to the actions and interactions of individuals.

Manuscript received: December 1, 1995.


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