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European Sociological Review 16:225-243 (2000)
© 2000 Oxford University Press
Community and the State The Relationship between Normative and Legal Controls
1 800 SWKT, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT84602, USA
Correspondence: christine_horne{at}byu.edu
This paper examines the relationship between legal and normative controls. Law and community are conceptualized as two institutions with alternative control structures. Legal sanctions are imposed by the state—whose expenses are paid for through taxes—at the request of group members. Informal normative sanctions are imposed by community members at their own expense. The argument suggests that varying the strengths of law and community affects these individual-level sanctioning decisions. In turn these behaviours affect the strengths of the two institutions. Two outcomes are proposed: 1) a cohesive community facilitates the growth of a strong legal system, and 2) investment in the legal system weakens community. These hypotheses are tested using experimental methods. The results are consistent with the prediction that a strong legal institution decreases community cohesion, and disconfirm the hypothesis that a strong community contributes to the growth of the law.
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